law and otherwise-either in majority or in dissent, President Nixon's appointees proved themselves to be the "strict constructionists" (whatever that term means) favored by their Presidential sponsor. Thus, all four joined in upholding split jury verdicts in state criminal trials; 5 dissented against the Court's decisions invalidating the present system of imposing the death penalty; 6 and united in holding that the first amendment does not afford a newspaperman the constitutional privilege to withhold facts relevant to a grand jury's investigation of a crimeY An analysis of these and other decisions of the 1971 Term shows that it is conceivable if another vacancy on the Court should occur during President Nixon's tenure, that his five appointeesthen a majority of the Court-might join to overrule significant criminal law and other forwardlooking decisions of the Warren Court. This would be highly regrettable, both on the merits and because of the "Court packing" implications of such a result.
There is, however, some evidence in the decisions of the last Term, 8 An outstanding example is Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in the Northern Securities 9 case, which so dismayed President Theodore Roosevelt that the previously cordial social relationships between the President and the Justice were permanently ruptured. Time alone will provide the answer as to whether the Burger Court will indeed turn back the judicial dock. I trust that this will not occur, both for the sake of the Court and the Nation.
Let us look at the decisions themselves as a portent for the future. In a foreword the treatment must necessarily be summary; the student notes which follow will provide detailed analysis and amplification of a number of the cases handed down this Term.
In dealing with decisions of the Supreme Court, or, for that matter, any court, in the criminal law area, judges should be mindful of the humanitarian approach of Sir Winston Churchill, expressed more than sixty years ago when he occupied the office of Home Secretary. On July 20, 1910, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, that great statesman and politician said:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. A calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of any accused, and even of the convicted criminal, against the State-a constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punishment-a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry those who have paid their due in the hard coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerative processes: unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if you can find it, in the heart of every man. These are symbols, which, in the treatment of crime and the criminal, mark and measure the stored up strength of a nation, and are sign, and proof of the living virtue within
The Supreme Court, during Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice, attempted to decide criminal cases in this spirit which is reflected in the provisions of our Bill of Rights. It is the criminal law decisions of the Warren Court which are most frequently attacked, for a variety of reasons. First, there is a justifiable concern in our country about the increase in crime; some mistakenly believe that the increase is somehow linked to the expan- sion of constitutional safeguards for criminal defendants. Second, "Take the handcuffs off the police" is a profitable political slogan. Third, a number of scholars are urging a reversal of such rights. And fourth, the criminal decisions do not necessarily share the compelling moral considerations of the Court's civil rights decisions, the majoritarian popularity of the Reapportionment cases, or the emerging popular appeal of free speech, press, and privacy cases 1 There are two other pertinent criteria by which criminal law decisions of both the Warren and the Burger Courts should be measured. First, it should be asked whether the Court has dealt in realities, and not legal fictions. Examples of dealing in realities are the Warren Court's decisions in the reapportionment area 12 and the cases which sought to eliminate the invidious effects of poverty on individuals' constitutional rights when facing the administration of justice.
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The second criterion deals with the role of constitutional stare decisis. I believe that here stare decisis traditionally applies with a ratchet-like effect-that when the Supreme Court is urged to overrule in order to cut back the individual's fundamental constitutional protections against governmental interference, the commands of stare decisis are all but absolute; but when the Court overrules to expand personal liberties, the doctrine imposes a markedly less restrictive caution 4 There are a number of compelling reasons for courts to hesitate in overruling prior decisions. In a very real sense stare decisis fosters public confidence in the judiciary and public acceptance of individual decisions by giving the assurance of impersonal consistent opinions.
15 Second, the concept buttresses judges against their own natural tendencies and prejudices. 16 Despite these compelling reasons, in the area of constitutionally protected personal liberties there traditionally has been room for flexibility in the doctrine. The constitutional safeguards of our fundamental liberties were instilled with an innate capacity for growth to enable them to meet new evils. This was probably best stated by Justice McKenna in Weems v. United States,1' a case in which the Court struck down as cruel and unusual punishment a harsh and inhuman penalty known as cadena temporal, then used in the Philippines Territory:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is pecuharly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general.principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. It is interesting to note that Weems is a much relied upon precedent in the several opinions in the recent death penalty cases. REv. 193, 202 (1952) . back on the rights of unpopular minorities is ameliorated by constitutional stare decisis. Another factor weighing in favor of the application of the doctrine in this area is the symbolic importance of Supreme Court pronouncements. The Court, in effect, sets, to a large extent, a moral tone for the country. Giving official sanction to a contraction of fundamental rights can only have a deleterious effect on the country as a whole. Surely a contrary result in the death penalty cases would have had such an effect."
Furman v. Georgia" is a prime example illustrative of my theory of constitutional stare decisis. Here the Court held the death penalty to be unconstitutional, at least in the setting presented by this case and its companions. When I was on the Court, I could but muster two other votes (ustices Douglas and Brennan) for even granting certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the death penalty as imposed upon a convicted rapist who had neither taken nor endangered life. 4 In Furman, five Justices for varying reasons held the death penalty, as traditionally applied, unconstitutional. It is true that the five were holdovers from the Warren Court and the four dissenters were President Nixon's appointees. But nevertheless a majority not available during the Warren era became available on the Burger Court. Indeed, as Justice McKenna said in Weems, "time works changes."'
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Furman is a great step forward in the Court's and our country's history. This is true despite the much commented upon limitations of the case. Six to seven hundred persons on death row will not be executed. Our country will not have to endure the barbaric notion of mass hangings, gassings, and electrocutions being carried out under the auspices of law enforcement. And while Justice Stewart's and Justice White's opinions might permit the imposition of the death penalty, if imposed less arbitrarily than as now, it is extremely doubtful that it will be legislatively revised. As it now stands, the Court has made a great contribution to what Camus has termed the "great civilizing step. that the Attorney General may not authorize electronic surveillance of domestic subversives without prior judicial approval. Justice Powell wrote that the fourth amendment normally requires a warrant for all searches, and that this situation is not an exception. This decision goes a long way toward restoring warrants for searches and arrests to their rightful place in the law. I share Justice Jackson's view that greater value should be placed upon searches and seizures accomplished through the use of warrants than searches without a warrant s In writing this opinion, the Court is asking magistrates to fulfill the mandate that they not operate as rubber stamps for police and prosecutors in issuing warrants. They should in fact act as detached, neutral magistrates; all too often in the past this has not been the case.
There counsel, guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwrigt,n is not governed by the classification of the offense. No accused may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdenteanor, without benefit of counsel. This is a logical and realistic expansion of the right to counsel, particularly in light of the fact that the questions involved in a misdemeanor case will often be as complex as those in a felony charge and the ultimate result may be incarceration in jail, albeit for a shorter term. Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred in the result of the case but indicated that they would leave to judicial discretion the decision as to whether counsel is required in a given case. I have long felt that discretion, in the criminal law area, all too often is synonymous with an abnegation of law. Leaving discretion to the courts is permissible and even desirable in equity proceedings, but has little place in a criminal trial. Indeed, in Furman v. Georgia,1 the arbitrary discretion left to judges and juries in applying the death penalty proved fatal to it in Justice White's and Stewart's opinions. 4 the Warren Court held that a state must afford an indigent defendant, in a felony case, a trial record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of his claims on appeal. -In Mayer, the current Court, in a unanimous opinion extended this right to defendants convicted on non-felony charges. This decision is a step forward from Draper. Surely the time has come, however, to go further and order a transcript in all cases, inasmuch as bills of exception are often difficult to settle and the real flavor of a trial can only be discerned in a complete trial record.
An expansion of fundamental rights also occurred in the Court's decision in Brooks v. Tennessee." A Tennessee statute required a defendant in a criminal proceeding to testify, if he wished to testify at all, before any other testimony for the defense was heard. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that such a statute was an unconstitutional infringement on one's privilege against self-incrimination. Thus the right against self-incrimination was expanded to include the right of a defendant to testify, if he so elects, at any time during the presentation of his case. Any other rule, Justice Brennan noted, would be an impermissible restriction on the defendant's right to remain silent until he chooses to speak and to suffer no penalty for such silence. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
Three other expansive decisions of the Court this Term bear noting. The right of a grand jury witness to invoke as a defense to a contempt charge the fact that the government obtained its information concerning him through a warrantless wiretapping was established in through Chief Justice Burger, held that a parolee is entitled to a full due process hearing prior to parole revocation. This is a major advance in the area of criminal justice. The third case is Groppi v. Leslie,3 in which the Court unanimously, through Chief Justice Burger, held that the due process right to notice and a hearing extends to those persons cited for contempt by state legislatures. Historically, the whole concept of contempts being tried by legislatures stems from the fact that in Great Britain the Houses of Parliament, and particularly the House of Lords with its Law Lords, are considered judicial bodies, and thus possess the contempt power. Our Congress, however, is differently constituted. Further, Great Britain is lacking in a written Bill of Rights expressly restricting legislative powers. It seems obvious that Congress and state legislatures are not equipped to try contempt cases, much less without giving the alleged contemnor notice or an opportunity to defend himself. Indeed, Congress itself has wisely recognized that this is so by remitting contempt of Congress cases to the courts for trial.% At the outset I commented that on occasion the Burger Court during its last Term confounded its admirers, and the cases to which I have above referred demonstrate that the Burger Court is not invariably as "strict constructionist" as some of its proponents anticipated.
5 5 I also pointed out, however, that in a considerable number of decisions the Burger Court confirmed some of the 61 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970) requires that any illegally intercepted communication, or any evidence derived therefrom, cannot be admitted in any proceeding before a grand jury. The Court read this provision to provide a defense to a contempt citation issued for refusal to answer questions before the grand jury.
"407 U.S. 297 (1972 Winship' 6 does not require a unanimous verdict. In my estimation, our jury system is seriously undermined by this decision. We have long recognized that it is far better to occasionally allow a guilty person to go free than to chance unjustly punishing innocent defendants. Hence, we have the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement. The decision in Johnson appears to move away from this philosophy and toward the position that it is more important that the guilty be convicted. Moreover, the decision will tend to discourage an essential ingredient in our criminal justice system: considered deliberation by the jury. Juries are now allowed to count heads as to a verdict rather than forced to closely examine the evidence to reach a unanimous conclusion.
In Apodaca, the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist said that the sixth amendment, although applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, does not require a unanimous verdict. Justice Powell, in concurring and supplying the deciding vote, held that the sixth amendment does require unanimous verdicts in federal cases, but when applied to the states through the fourteenth does not incorporate a unanimity requirement.Y This is an adoption of the late Justice Harlan's concept of a watered-down incorporation of the Bill of Rights when applied to the states. This theory has been rejected by the Court on a number of occasions in the past. judge must hold a hearing, out of the jury's presence, to determine the voluntariness of a defendant's confession. In the Twomey case the current Court held that the standard of proof required to be used in such a hearing is "a preponderance of the evidence" and not "beyond a reasonable doubt." In Jackson, the Court did not specifically address itself to the proper evidentiary standard. A logical application of Jackson would have led to a "reasonable doubt" standard. The procedure established in Jackson was designed to safeguard the right of an accused not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances. The procedure was designed to entitle the defendant "to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily rendered." n The rationale of Jackson leads to the conclusion that only the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard adequately protects against the danger that involuntary confessions will be employed in criminal trials. Realistically, Twomey cuts back on Jackson.
Adams v. Williamsn presented the Court with the difficult problem of reconciling the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures against the need to give policemen reasonable latitude in exercising their duties. The case dealt with the Terry v. Ohio 7' exception to the probable cause requirement for all searches and seizures. Under Terry, a policeman who suspects there is criminal activity afoot may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons when he has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. The majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Adams, joined in by the Chief Justice and Justices White, Powell, and Blackmun, extended Terry to situations in which a policeman's belief concerning criminal activity and dangerousness of the suspect are based upon information obtained from an informant. I fully appreciate that the lot of a policeman in these troubled times is not a happy one. The search conducted in Adams, however, was carried out pursuant to information supplied by an unknown informer, not shown to have been reliable, and who gave no information which demonstrated any personal knowledge of the situation. Furthermore, the informant's tip was uncorroborated. In such circumstances, a warrant could not have 7 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489 (opinion of the Court).
407 U.S. 143 (1972). 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
been validly issued. 74 There is a great danger in legitimating stops and frisks without any probable cause. Indeed, such a result is inconsistent with Justice Powell's opinion in United States v. United States District Court," in which he placed considerable emphasis on obtaining a warrant.
I repeat in summation that some forward steps were taken by the Court this Term in the criminal law area. However, it must be said that the change in the Court's personnel did have the effect in other instances of contracting fundamental rights and, in several cases, of not extending fundamental rights to the full sweep of the guiding constitutional guarantees. To recapitulate, the right to an attorney at a pre-indictment lineup was denied by the Court in a five-four vote in which the four recent appointees all cast their votes with the majority. In another five-four case, the Court held that there is no right, in a state court, to a unanimous jury verdict. Again, the four new appointees voted with the majority. Further, the right to a voluntariness hearing was not extended, as it logically should have been by the Court-this time by the deciding vote of a Warren Court Justice. Instead of requiring an evidentiary standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" to the determination by a trial judge of the voluntariness of a defendant's confession, a majority of the Court established a "preponderance of the evidence" test. In this four-three decision, both new appointees who participated in the consideration of the case voted with the majority.
It is interesting to compare the results of the Court's criminal law decisions with some of the Court's holdings in other areas of the law. There were similarly some advances in the protection of fundamental rights, but, at the same time, there were several substantial retreats from previously established positions. The greatest expansion came in the voting area. A Texas statute which imposed filing fees of such magnitude that numerous candidates were precluded from filing was held to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law by the State of Texas. In its unanimous 74 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) , requires that while the government may rely on hearsay information from an informant in applying for a search warrant, the application must set forth underlying circumstances to allow the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's conclusion and the informant must be shown to be reliable. If these conditions are not met, the government must provide corroboration for the informant's conclusion. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) .
75 407 U.S. 297 (1972) . v. Carter, 6 the Court pointed out that since the fees fell with unequal weight on candidates and their supporters according to the candidates' ability to pay the fees, the state was required to come forth with compelling reasons for imposing them, not merely some rational basis. This Texas did not do. L, so deciding, the Court properly applied what has been called the "new equal protection": when a suspect criterion (e.g., wealth or race) is used by a state to discriminate against certain individuals, or a fundamental right is involved (voting in this case), the state must show a compelling state objective or the discrimination will not be tolerated. A rational basis alone for the discrimination will not suffice.
The other voting case handled by the Court this term resulted in a Tennessee one-year residency requirement being struck down as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. The majority in Dunn v. Blumstein,1 7 through Justice Marshall, held that, absent a compelling state interest, a state may not burden the right to travel (a fundamental right) by penalizing those bona fide residents who have recently traveled from one jurisdiction to another by denying them the right to vote (a fundamental right). Although Tennessee had an obvious interest in preserving the purity of the ballot box, a 30-day residency requirement would have adequately protected the electoral process, according to the majority. Justice Blackmun concurred, noting that he did not consider the Court to be holding that every state must have no greater than a 30-day residency requirement, but that the constitutionality of a 35, 45 or 75-day requirement, for example, was left to the future. Chief Justice Burger dissented.
The first amendment's free exercise clause prevailed over Wisconsin's interest in seeking universal education in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
s In writing for a nearly unanimous Court (Justice Douglas dissented in part), the Chief Justice held that the Amish need not comply with Wisconsin's compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth grade, because to comply would gravely endanger, if not destroy, the free exercise of their religious beliefs. The Chief Justice took cognizance of the fact that the Amish had a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society and that they deni. that, save for racial issues, the doctrines of "fundamental rights," "suspect criteria," and "compelling state interests" have no place in a decision concerning the equal protection clause of the fourteefith amendment. The upholding of such a view would represent a reversion to a concept of the fourteenth amendment without any support in the opinions of the Court since before the turn of the century. I venture to say that it will not gain any adherents in the Court and will not be further pursued by its author.
In 4 The respondents, who had sought to distribute handbills in opposition to the Vietnam war, in the interior mall area of petitioner's large, privately owned shopping center, were denied this right by the Court, on the grounds that there was no state action and therefore no state denial of any first amendment rights. The majority distinguished this case from Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 85 in which the Court had held that a shopping center was like a "business district," its operations thus being state action, on the basis that in Logan Valley the demonstrators were exercising first amendment rights directly related to the operations. of the shopping center. This is not a distinction made in Logan Valley, nor is it a valid basis upon which to deny individual's first amendment rights. The four new appointees plus Justice White comprised the majority. The dissenters noted that the shopping center involved in the case at bar was as much, if not more, an integral part of the surrounding community as was the Logan Valley Plaza shopping center. In fairness to the majority, it must be noted that they have attempted to interpret the oath as nothing more than a reiteration of the often sanctioned oath "to uphold and defend the Constitution." However, this decision would appear to be somewhat of a contraction of fundamental first amendment rights, for there is no assurance that the states will heed such an interpretation, with the result being a potential chilling effect on state employees' first amendment rights. Two other cases seem to me to look backward rather than forward. Justice White, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, held, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 8 9 that the first amendment does not afford a newspaperman a constitutional privilege to withhold facts relevant to a grand jury's investigation of a crime, or to conceal the criminal conduct of his source of evidence thereof. There is no question that this decision will have an adverse effect on what newspapermen decide to publish in the future. As a consequence of newspapermen's fear of being forced to expose confidential sources, the public will be denied their right to hear and be heard. As a realistic matter, there will be a contraction of first amendment rights. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 0 the issue involved was the standing of a conservationist group to oppose the commerical development of Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. Although the club had a long history of a special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges, and forests of our country, the Court held that absent a showing of personalized injury, economic or otherwise, to the club's members as individuals, the club itself had no standing to attack the proposed project. The club, therefore, would have had stand-
